Violations of Human Rights in Time of War As War Crimes by Levie, Howard
Violations of Human Rights in Time of War 
As War Crimes 
24 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 119 (1995) 
T here is a tendency to consider the term "human rights" as being solely applicable to the peacetime protection of those rights and to consider the 
term "humanitarian law" as being applicable to the protection of human rights 
afforded by the law of war in time of war. 1 Without doubt, the humanitarian 
law of war includes much of the law which, in time of peace, would be termed 
human rights; and there is no reason why they should not continue to bear that 
tide in time of war. However, it must be borne in mind that although all of the 
law of war is humanitarian, not all of the humanitarian law of war involves 
human rights. For example, while the provision of the law of war prohibiting 
the use of dumdum buliets2 is unquestionably a humanitarian rule, it can scarcely 
be considered to be a human right. 
In drafting the 1945 London Charter, the instrument that created the 
International Military Tribunal which tried the major war criminals at 
Nuremberg, the draftsman included two provisions defining acts constituting 
violations of the humanitarian law of war and violations of human rights in time 
of war. Those provisions read as follows: 
Article 6(b). War Crimes. Namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such 
violations shall include, but shall not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or 
deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in 
occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the 
seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public ~r private property, wanton destruction 
of cities, towns, or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity. 
Article 6(c). Crimes against humanity. Namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, 
deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, 
before or during the war or persecutions on political, racial or religious 
grounds ... whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where 
perpetrated.3 
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The provisions of Article 5(b) and 5(c) of the Charter of the International 
Military Tribunal for the Far East which tried the major Japanese war criminals 
at Tokyo were substantially similar.4 
The contention was frequently advanced that the provisions of Article 6(c) 
concerning Crimes against Humanity, and others like them, created new 
humanitarian rules, new war crimes, and were, therefore, ex post facto laws. This 
contention was uniformly rejected by the tribunals. In the case of United States 
v. Otto Ohlendoif, better known as The Einsatzgruppen case, the Military Tribunal 
stated: 
Although the Nuernberg trials represent the first time that international tribunals 
have adjudicated crimes against humanity as an international offence, this does 
not . . . mean that a new offence has been added to the list of transgressions of 
man. Nuernberg has only demonstrated how humanity can be defended in court, 
and it is inconceivable that with this precedent extant, the law of humanity should 
ever lack for a tribunal.5 
In view of the judicial precedents and the numerous subsequent actions of the 
international community recognizing crimes against humanity as a wartime 
offence under internationallaw,6 the contention that crimes against humanity 
are not well-established violations of the humanitarian law of war now has no 
merit whatsoever. 
A major example of a wartime violation of human rights occurred during 
World War I when the Imperial German Government caused the deportation 
from their homes in Belgium and France of a total of approximately 100,000 
men, women and children, to be used as forced labour in Germany. This practice 
was discontinued, and many of the deportees were repatriated when the Imperial 
German Government responded to neutral indignation at this patent violation 
of human rights? During World War II, the Nazis relentlessly followed the 
same practice, but on a far greater scale, with an estimated total of 12,000,000 
persons moved from their various home countries to Nazi Germany to perform 
forced labour, for the most part in munitions factories.8 In this instance, there 
were comparatively few neutral nations to express their indignation and, in any 
event, it is doubtful that such action on their part would have had any effect on 
Hitler's Nazi Government. The comparatively small percentage of deported 
persons who survived the extreme ill-treatment that they uniformly received 
were forced to remain in Germany as virtual slaves until rescued by Allied 
advances or until the German surrender. The prohibition of this practice has 
now been codified in Article 49 of the 1949 Geneva Convention (IV) Relative 
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 9 the first paragraph of 
which states: 
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Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons 
from occupied territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or to that of any 
other country, occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of their motive.10 
While the Japanese also engaged in this practice of deportation offoreign civilians 
to Japan for labour purposes, they did so on a much smaller scale. 11 
One major violation of human rights that occurred in Nazi Germany prior 
to, and on a greatly increased scale, during W orId War II, was the incarceration 
of individuals, both German and foreign, citizens of both friendly and enemy 
countries, in concentration camps, to which they were sent at the whim of the 
Gestapo, the SS and the other Nazi security organizations. No judicial 
proceedings were involved in these actions, either before or during the 
imprisonment. There was no way to challenge the action, no way to obtain a 
hearing before an impartial judge. This was obviously a gross violation of human 
rights both in time of peace and in time of war. Moreover, some of these 
concentration camps were basically extermination camps, places that were set 
up for the sole purpose of exterminating inmates on a wholesale scale, individuals 
whose only offences were that they were merely suspected of less than 100 
percent support of the Nazi government, or they were Jews, or gypsies, or 
citizens of a foreign nation, even though the latter might have been a German 
ally.12 For example, it is known that between four million and six million 
individuals were exterminated by the use of gas at the camp established by the 
Nazis in Auschwitz, Poland.13 Exterminations on a large scale also took &lace 
at concentration camps located at Belsen (tried by the British), 4 at 
Buchenwald15 and Dachau 16 (tried by the United States), at Natzweiler (tried 
by the French),17 etc. 
Another Nazi practice which was unquestionably a violation of human rights 
and which was conducted against both Germans and foreigners, was 
euthanasia-the killing of persons who were terminally or mentally ill-the 
individuals whom Hitler called "useless eaters." Based upon the evidence 
submitted to it, the International Military Tribunal estimated that some 275,000 
individuals had been killed in this manner. IS Allied war crimes tribunals tried a 
number of cases involving this blatant violation of human rights; 19 and long after 
World War II had come to an end, the Federal Republic of Germany succeeded 
in obtaining the extradition for trial of several individuals, including medical 
doctors, charged with this offence.20 
A number of the post-World War II trials in Europe involved the use of 
enemy personnel for purposes of medical experiments, many of which 
completely lacked any merit and practically all of which resulted in the death of 
the victims?1 Such a use of defenceless persons was certainly a violation of 
human rights and of the humanitarian law of war. At least one such case was 
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tried by the United States in Japan?2 In addition, the Soviet Union tried a 
number of members of the Japanese Army on the charge that they had used 
human beings (Chinese, Russian, and, perhaps, American) to test the efficacy 
of bacteriological weapons.23 
Two other Nazi practices that constituted violations of human rights, based 
on orders emanating direcdy from Hider, were the so-called Night and Fog 
Decrei4 and the Terrorist and Sabotage Decree.25 Under the former, the death 
penalty was to be applicable for all acts committed by non-Germans against the 
German State or its authorities in occupied territory. Such cases were to be tried 
in the occupied territory in which they had occurred only if it was probable that 
a death sentence would be adjudged. Otherwise the accused persons were to be 
taken to Germany where they were quickly executed without trial or, in rare 
cases, sent to a concentration camp. Inquiries concerning such persons were to 
be answered with the statement that "the state of the proceeding did not allow 
further information," thus keeping the families in ignorance concerning the 
status of the accused persons, the great majority of whom did not live to return 
to their homes. This procedure was inhumane and was a gross violation of human 
rights and of the humanitarian law of war. 
The second practice mentioned was based on the Terrorist and Sabotage Decree. 
This decree provided that with respect to all acts of violence by non-Germans 
directed against German personnel or installations in occupied territory, the 
offenders were to be overpowered on the spot (this meant they were to be 
killed). If not apprehended until later, they were to be turned over to the Security 
Police (again, this meant that they were to be killed). No judicial proceedings 
to determine guilt were to take place. Death could result from the mere whim 
of the occupation authorities. Again, this procedure was inhumane and a gross 
violation of human rights and of the humanitarian law of war. (It is interesting 
to know that as a humanitarian gesture, women who did not themselves 
participate in such attacks were only to be given assigned work-and children 
were to be spared!) 
If we consider, as we undoubtedly should, that many of the humanitarian 
protections to which prisoners of war are entided, under both the customary 
and conventional laws of war, are human rights, then these were human rights 
that were violated on a vast scale by the Germans, by the Soviet Union and by 
the Japanese. Probably in excess of one million Soviet prisoners of war died from 
maltreatment in the hands of the Nazis; and approximately a similar number of 
German prisoners of war never returned from Soviet custody. Strange to relate, 
the Nazis substantially complied with the humanitarian law of war with respect 
to British and American prisoners of war, perhaps because they knew that 
German prisoners of war held by Great Britain and the United States were 
receiving appropriate humane treatment. There was no such reciprocity on the 
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part of the Japanese, where violations of the humanitarian law of war for the 
protection of prisoners of war were standard procedure. In this respect, it is 
worthy of note that while only four percent of the Americans known to have 
been in German custody died in captivity, more than 27 percent of the 
Americans known to have been in Japanese custody did not survive.26 
With the possible exception of the Falklands (Malvinas) War between the 
Argentine and Great Britain,27 incidents involving the denial of human rights 
and of the humanitarian law of war to enemy civilians and captured enemy 
personnel have occurred in every international conflict since the end ofW orld 
War II. This despite the post-war war crimes trials, one of the purposes of which 
was to establish a precedent beyond dispute that such offences would not go 
unpunished. However, a number of those conflicts ended in negotiated 
settlements, that included a requirement for the return of all prisoners of war. 
That provision necessarily resulted in the repatriation of even those who had 
been identified as having committed offences, including violations of human 
rights and of the humanitarian law of war, for which they should have been tried 
and, if convicted, sentenced to appropriate punishment. Similarly, the leaders 
of the authoritarian governments which initiated these wars and frequently made 
violations of human rights a basic element of State policy during such conflicts 
have gone unpunished. This was true as to one or both of these factors in Korea 
(1950-53), in Vietnam (1965-72), in the India-Pakistan War (1972), in the 
Iran-Iraq War (1980-88) and in the Gulf Crisis (1990-91). 
In Korea, the United Nations Command had identified and was prepared to 
try some 200 North Koreans and Chinese Communists charged with violations 
of the humanitarian law of war applicable to prisoners of war as well as violations 
of the human rights of South Korean civilians. Because of the provisions of the 
Armistice Ageement, all of these individuals were repatriated and went 
unpunished. 
In Vietnam, there were innumerable instances of violations of the 
humanitarian law of war and innumerable instances of violations of human rights. 
For example, captured American soldiers and airmen who were wounded 
received no medical treatment, they were subjected to solitary confinement, 
confined in prisons, and paraded before hostile crowds, the members of which 
were permitted and encouraged to assault them with sticks and stones. These 
were all violations of the humanitarian law of war by the North Vietnamese. 
Moreover, the Viet Cong executed innocent prisoners of war in reprisal for the 
execution after trial of Viet Cong terrorists, one of whom had been captured in 
Saigon while still in possession of a bomb set to explode just five minutes later. 
These gross violations of the humanitarian law of war by the North Vietnamese 
and by the Viet Cong received little or no publicity. Unfortunately, the only 
case that received widespread publicity was the slaughter of a group of 
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Vietnamese men, women and children by American soldiers, also a gross 
violation of human rights. Regrettably, because of unwarranted political 
interference only two trials by court-martial for this incident took place. While 
the major culprit, one Lieutenant William L. Calley, was convicted of murder 
by a United States Army court-martial and was sentenced to be p'unished, his 
punishment was manifestly inadequate for the offence committed.29 
In the December 1972 india-Pakistan conflict, India charged the Pakistani 
Army with having committed genocide in what was then East Pakistan (now 
Bangladesh) during an attempt to suppress a revolt in that area. In 1974, India 
agreed to repatriate the more than 90,000 Pakistani prisoners of war whom they 
still detained, despite the fact that there had long since been a cessation of active 
hostilities between the two countries. However, it withheld 195 of them for 
trial by Bangladesh for the crime of genocide. Pakistan brought an action against 
India in the International Court of Justice, pointing out that both countries were 
parties to the Genocide Convention,30 Article 6 of which provides that 
jurisdiction to conduct trials for violations thereof is limited to the sovereign in 
whose territory the alleged genocide had pccurred (in this case Pakistan) or to 
an international criminal court (an institution that does not yet exist). By 
agreement, the 195 prisoners of war were eventually repatriated to Pakistan and 
the action in the International Court of Justice was discontinued. No trial was 
conducted by Pakistan. Without intending any criticism ofpakistan, and without 
passing judgment on the guilt or innocence of any of the 195 Pakistanis singled 
out by India for trial, this is indicative of the limitations of the Genocide 
Convention. In most instances, genocide is and will be government sponsored 
so that, lacking an international criminal court, unless the offence is committed 
on foreign territory, there will be no punishment of the offending persons. As 
already noted, during World War II, the Nazis maintained "extermination 
camps" for the killing of Jews, gypsies, and other persons considered to be 
"asocial", not only in Germany, but also in Poland and in the Soviet Union. 
Had the Genocide Convention been in effect at that time, only the subsequent 
German governments would have been competent to try those accused who 
had committed their offences in concentration camps located on German 
. 31 temtory. 
Concerning the maltreatment of prisoners of war by both sides in the Iran-Iraq 
War, a Special Mission dispatched to those countries by the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations found that 
harsh treatment and violence in the camps [in both countries] were far from 
uncommon. POWs provided a large volume of information about their physical 
ill-treatment, by such means as whipping, beating with truncheons or cables, 
simultaneous blows on both ears, electric shocks, assaults on sexual organs and 
kicks often inflicted in parts of the body where POWs had suffered wounds. 
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Physical violence appeared to be particularly common in POW camps in Iraq. 
We also received reports of collective punishment measures, such as lengthy 
confinement and deprivation of food and water ... 32 
These actions were, of course, gross violations of the humanitarian law of war, 
specifically of various provisions of the 1949 Geneva Convention (III) Relative 
to the Treatment of Prisoners ofWar.33 
Another violation of the humanitarian law of war which occurred in both 
Iran and Iraq is worthy of note. Thus, the United Nations Special Mission said: 
[W]e also heard allegations of religious pressure on non-Moslem POWs and of 
conversions to Islam by some Christian POWs. While we were not able to 
ascertain whether these conversions had taken place under duress, we could not 
but notice the atmosphere of missionary zeal that permeated some camps.34 
If these conversions occurred as a result of duress, as they very probably did, this 
was contrary to the freedom of religion provisions of Article 34 of Geneva 
Convention (III) and constituted a violation of human rights and of the 
humanitarian law of war. 
One other statement made by the United Nations Special Mission in its report 
bears repeating: 
Having noted that numerous POWs have spent three or more years in detention, 
we feel cO~felled to pose the question: is not prolonged captivity in itselfinhurnan 
treatment? 
During World War II, some prisoners of war spent as many as five years in 
captivity. During Vietnam, some prisoners of war spent as many as seven years 
in captivity. During the Iran-Iraq conflict, there were undoubtedly prisoners of 
war on both sides who spent similar lengthy periods in prisoner-of-war camps. 
These were not criminals serving a well-deserved punishment, but persons who 
had fought on behalf of their country. Whether their country fights as an 
aggressor or in defence of its territory and existence, there should be some 
method of securing the release and repatriation of frisoners of war more humane 
than awaiting the cessation of active hostilities? Perhaps we should return to 
the processes of exchange and parole, which have not been used on a major 
scale since the American Civil War of more than a century and a quarter ago. 
However, if this is to be done, it must be accomplished by an international 
agreement such as the 1949 Geneva Conventions, negotiated in time of peace. 
Such a treaty must be complete in itself, as it is extremely difficult, and sometimes 
impossible, to secure agreements between opposing belligerents during the 
fh tili·· 37 course 0 os b.es. 
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The 1990-91 Gulf Crisis quickly disclosed that the two-year period which 
had elapsed since the end of hostilities in the Iran-Iraq War had not brought 
about any change in the attitude of Saddam Hussein's Iraq with respect to 
compliance with the humanitarian law of war in general and with human rights 
in particular. From 2 August 1990, the very first day ofIraq's invasion of Kuwait, 
violations by Iraq of the humanitarian law of war and of human rights occurred 
on a massive scale. 
At the time of the Iraqi invasion, the members of the civilian population of 
Kuwait and foreigners in Kuwait were considered "protected persons" \vithin 
the meaning of Article 4(1) of the 1949 Geneva Convention (IV).38 Thousands 
of Kuwaiti civilians were murdered and thousands of others were deported to 
Iraq. Both of these actions constituted violations of human rights and of the 
humanitarian law of war. Under Article 47 of that Convention, their status was 
not changed by the announced annexation of Kuwait by Iraq on 8 August 1990, 
which, in any event, was illegal and ineffective.39 Under Article 35(1) of that 
Convention, the foreigners had the right to leave Kuwait. The Iraqi authorities 
ordered that they be detained as hostages. This was a violation of the 
humanitarian law of war 40 and a violation of their human rights. Moreover, Iraq 
magnified the violations by placing hostages in military installations, including 
chemical weapons factories, in an attempt to immunize those installations from 
attack by the United Nations Coalition. This, too, was a violation of the 
humanitarian law of war which specifically provides that "[t]he presence of a 
protected person may not be used to render certain points or areas immune from 
military operations.,,41 One well-informed author has listed the Iraqi violations 
of the humanitarian law of war in part as follows: 
* inhumane treatment of protected persons, as prohibited by Article 27 of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention, including willful killing and the protection of 
women against rape; 
* torture and brutality directed against protected persons, as prohibited by Article 
32 of the Fourth Geneva Convention; 
* the taking of hostages, as prohibited by Article 34 of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention; 
* mass transfers, detention of protected persons in areas particularly exposed to 
the danger of war, or transfer of part of an occupying power's own population 
into the territory it occupies, as prohibited by Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention; 
* compelling protected persons to serve in the armed forces of the occupying 
power, as prohibited by Article 51 of the Fourth Geneva Convention; 
* setting up places of interrunent in areas particularly exposed to the danger of 
war, as prohibited by Article 83 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.42 
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It is apparent from all of the foregoing that, despite the hundreds of provisions 
of the codified humanitarian law of war, provisions that establish minimum 
standards and provisions that specifically prohibit certain actions, in time of war 
the humanitarian law of war and the laws establishing human rights are all too 
frequendy violated, sometimes by individual behaviour, but perhaps even more 
often by national policy. Regrettably, we cannot be overly optimistic in this 
regard with respect to the future conflicts with which our planet will 
undoubtedly be plagued. However, one great step in the right direction has been 
taken by the United Nations Security Council in the case of the rampant 
violations of human rights and of the humanitarian law of war committed by 
the government and the troops of the former Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro) in the Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Beginning as early 
as September 1991, a series of resolutions has been adopted by the Security 
Council with respect to the armed conflict taking place in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Thus, Resolution 771 contains the following preambular 
provision: 
, 
Expressing grave alarm at continuing reports of widespread violations of 
intemational humanitarian law occurring within the territory of the fonner 
Yugoslavia and especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina including reports of mass 
forcible expulsion and deportation of civilians, imprisonment and abuse of civilians 
in detention centres, deliberate attacks on noncombatants, hospitals and 
ambulances, impeding the delivery of food and medical supplies to the civilian 
population, and wanton devastation and destruction ofproperty.43 
Its operative paragraphs include the following: 
1. Reqffirms that all parties to the conflict are bound to comply with their 
obligations under intemational humanitarian law and in particular the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and that persons who commit or order the 
commission of grave breaches of the Conventions are individually responsible in 
respect of such breaches; 
2. Strongly condemns any violations of international humanitarian law, including 
those involved in the practice of "ethnic cleansing"; 
S. Calls upon States and, as appropriate, intemational humanitarian organizations 
to collate substantiated infonnation in their possession or submitted to them 
relating to the violations of humanitarian law, including grave breaches of the 
Geneva Conventions, being committed in the territory of the fonner Yugoslavia 
and to make this information available to the Council. 
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A resolution adopted on 6 October 1992 went a step further, creating a 
Commission of Experts to examine the infonnation submitted pursuant to the 
above quoted paragraph 5. The Commission could make its own investigations 
and was·to provide the Secretary-General with its conclusions with respect to 
the evidence of the violations of international humanitarian law committed in 
the territory of the fonner Yugoslavia.44 
By a resolution adopted on 22 February 1993, the Security Council decided 
that 
an international tribunal shall be established for the prosecution of persons 
responsible for serious violations ofintemational humanitarian law committed in 
the territory of the fonner Yugoslavia since 1991.45 
This resolution requested the Secretary-General to submit proposals for the 
establishment of such an international tribunal. He did so on 3 May 199346 and 
by a resolution adopted on 25 May 1993 the Security Council approved the 
proposals made by the Secretary-General in his Report, including the proposed 
Statute of the International Tribunal attached to that Report.47 
Article 1 of the Statute establishes the competence of the International 
Tribunal "to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law committed in the territory of the fonner Yugoslavia since 
1991.,,48 Article 2 gives the Tribunaljurisdiction over "persons committing or 
ordering to be committed grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions;,,49 Article 
3 gives the Tribunaljurisdiction over "persons violating the laws or customs of 
war" which include, but are not limited to, those enumerated;50 Article 4 gives 
the Tribunal jurisdiction over genocidal crimes;51 and Article 5 gives the 
Tribunaljurisdiction over crimes against humanity.52 
While there is no question that major difficulties will be encountered in 
obtaining personal jurisdiction over individuals charged with violations of 
human rights and of the humanitarian law of war enumerated in the Statute of 
the International Tribunal,53 and in collecting the evidence necessary for their 
convictions, the mere fact that such a Statute has been unanimously adopted by 
the Security Council augurs well for the future. 54 
In addition to the actions of the Security Council with respect to the violations 
of the humanitarian law of war by the fonner Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, on 20 March 1993 the latter two 
States instituted an action against the fonner in the International Court of 
Justice,55 in which they asked for and obtained provisional measures of relie£56 
As there was no change in the activities of Serbia and Montenegro, no refraining 
from the policy of "ethnic cleansing" (genocide), Bosnia and Herzegovina 
returned to the Court seeking additional provisional measures of relie£57 
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Meanwhile, following the old adage that "the best defence is a good offence," 
Serbia and Montenegro countercharged that Bosnia and Herzegovina are 
themselves guilty of genocide, perpetrated against ethnic Serbs in the territo~ 
of the latter two States and, in tum, requested provisional measures of relie£5 
Unfortunately, there probably is at least some merit to this claim, as the Balkan 
ethnic groups have a long history of such actions, and there is little reason to 
believe that to day's Bosnian and Herzegovinian Croats and Muslims are radically 
different from those who preceded them. However, the Court did not grant 
hi 59 t s request. 
It is believed that the foregoing summary clearly indicates that the 
international community of the twentieth century has, in general, consistendy 
demonstrated a definite and sincere desire to ensure the protection of human 
rights in time of war. However, with all too great frequency, once hostilities 
have commenced, the legal protections so humanely granted have tended to be 
disregarded, often by nations which made great oratorical gestures during the 
course of drafting negotiations, but probably with no intention whatsoever, 
should the occasion arise, of complying with the humane provisions that they 
so strenuously supported. Nevertheless, the actions taken with respect to the 
former Yugoslavia may be interpreted as a small indication that the international 
community will no longer tolerate claims to the right of non-interference when 
a State engages in violations of human rights in time of war. 
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